Spelarkontrakt – teori.

*”Our model, which captures this important aspect of employment relations in football,has revealed that a risk-averse player benefits from the shadow of the transfersystem and therefore from a more restrictive transfer system. Under the pre-Bosman transfer system, clubs could partially insure their players against income-uncertainty by transforming a part of the players risky future salary in risk-free current income. A risk-averse player prefers a higher current salary combined witha lower (expected) future salary to a lower current salary combined with a higherbut uncertain future salary. The Bosman transfer system, which is equivalent to thepre-Bosman transfer system in terms of our model, did not change this situation since clubs and players voluntary restored the pre-Bosman world by expanding contract durations. However, by limiting the maximal contract duration to 5 years the insurance deal does not work anymore in the new Monti transfer system. As a consequence, the Monti transfer system can be considered as an impediment to Pareto efficient risk-allocation in the football industry. If risk can be considered as the basic source of productivity variations in football, the failure of the insurance market imposed by the free movement philosophy of the European institutionsmight impose a high price to be paid by the labour force in this industry.”

saxat från: Why Football Players May Benefit from the ‘Shadow of the Transfer System’ http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=934547

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